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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: The design of effective donor recruitment campaigns requires 
an accurate understanding of donor motivations. This requires cross-validation of 
theoretically derived, psychometrically assessed motivations with behavioural preferences. 
Theoretical models suggest that blood donors should be more sensitive than non-donors to 
violations of fairness norms. Specifically, active blood donors, compared to non-donors, 
should endorse beliefs of reciprocal fairness, norms of both positive and negative reciprocity 
and reject more unfair offers in a behavioural economic game (the ultimatum game). The 
current study is the first to test this hypothesis. 
Materials and Methods: Two studies are reported. One experimental psychometric study (N 
= 400), and one behavioural economic game using the ultimatum game (N = 60). 
Results: Consistent with the predictions, active and lapsed donors, compared to non-donors, 
were more likely to endorse beliefs of reciprocal fairness and active donors to endorse norms 
of both positive and negative reciprocity and reject more unfair offers in the ultimatum game. 
This pattern of motivations was unique to blood donors and not observed for other health 
(i.e., being on the organ donor register) and non-health (e.g., volunteering) pro-sociality. 
Conclusion: Blood donors heightened sensitivity to unfairness violations. This indicates a 
very clear and specific line for the development of interventions that align fairness, self-
interest and reciprocity, for example Voluntary Reciprocal Altruism (VRA). We also 
highlight the importance of establishing intervention development within a clinical trials 
model and emphasise why experimental work of this type is vital.  
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Recent evidence indicates that blood donors are motivated by altruistic mechanisms 
of (1) warm-glow (i.e., the act of donation results in feeling good) and (2) reluctant altruism, 
rather than pure altruism [1]. Reluctant altruism is a form of negative conditional 
cooperation, as reluctant altruists help because others do not [1-3]. Thus, reluctant altruists 
should more sensitive to violations of fairness norms [1]. Indeed, fairness is a central 
mechanism for understanding altruism and cooperation. That is, punishing violations of 
fairness helps to maintain cooperation [4], with increased fairness enhancing positive (“if you 
are nice to me, I will be nice to you”) and negative (“if people do me harm, I will look to take 
revenge”) reciprocity [5] and a desire to reduce inequalities [6]. This is especially the case 
when people perceive that fairness is intended [7]. Thus, as potential reluctant altruists, it is a 
reasonable conjecture that blood donors should also have strong beliefs in reciprocal fairness 
and be more sensitive to violations of fairness norms. The current paper is the first to 
examine fairness beliefs, reciprocity norms, and responses to violations of fairness norms in 
blood donors.  
Blood Donation and Fairness Norms: Normative Beliefs and The Ultimatum Game 
Fairness beliefs can be differentiated into: (1) reciprocal and (2) distributive fairness 
[8]. Reciprocal fairness reflects cooperative actions conditional on others’ cooperation (cf. 
conditional cooperation: [5]). Distributive fairness refers to sharing regardless of 
contribution, to ensure an equal share of resources proportional to need [8]. Reluctant 
altruism is associated with reciprocal rather than distributive fairness, as reluctant altruists 
have an underlying desire for a reciprocal cooperative/fair society. As such, we predict that 
blood donors should be more likely to endorse beliefs about reciprocal fairness. As both 
positive and negative reciprocity enhance fairness and cooperation [7], blood donors should 
endorse both more strongly than non-donors.  
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We use the ultimatum game (UG) as a behavioural test of reactions to violations of 
fairness norms. In the UG the first player (the proposer) proposes how to divide a sum of 
money with a second player (the recipient). The recipient has nothing, but knows what money 
the proposer has. The recipient can accept or reject the proposed division. If they reject the 
offer, both receive nothing. If the recipient accepts, both parties get the proposed share. Thus, 
for the responder, the UG pits selfishness (responders are always better off financially by 
taking any offered) against signalling fairness at a personal cost (losing the money offered) 
by rejecting unfair offers. Typically, recipients are more likely to reject offers as they become 
increasing unfair (moving from a 50:50 equal share to  90:10 - where the first figure reflects 
the proposer’s share and the second the recipient’s). If blood donors are more sensitive to 
violations of fairness norms, they should exhibit higher rejection rates than non-donors. This 
should be especially the case for ambiguously unfair offers. When a behaviour is 
ambiguously unfair, as seen in UG offers of 60:40 for example, evolutionary theory suggests 
that people are pre-disposed towards forgiveness as the unfairness may just be an error [9-
10]. If blood donors are more sensitive to fairness violations they should reject more 
ambiguous unfair offers compared to non-donors. 
Fairness Interventions. 
To explore further the role of fairness beliefs in blood donation, we examine an 
intervention based on fairness and reciprocity: voluntary reciprocal altruism (VRA) [11]. 
Specifically, VRA aligns norms of reciprocation, self-interest and fairness by asking people 
to consider their willingness to both accept and donate blood. However, it is not clear if the 
active ingredient of VRA is reciprocal or distributive fairness and if this requires both 
questions to be asked or whether one question is sufficient.  There is evidence that asking 
about acceptance only [12] or willingness only [13] can be effective for behaviour change. 
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Thus, we randomly allocate participants to respond to either both questions, only one 
question or neither to explore which affects fairness beliefs maximally.    
Donor Status and Pro-social Identity  
Blood donation is usually unrelated to other forms of pro-sociality [14]. Thus, blood 
donation may have a different fairness/reciprocity motivational profile compared to other 
pro-social acts. If so, recruiting blood donors by targeting other pro-social activities (e.g., 
organ donors) may not be a fruitful. To explore this we distinguish other pro-social acts in 
terms of (1) health vs non-health [14] and (2) donating money or time/effort [15]. We also 
explore the wider influences of family pro-sociality [16]. Finally, we distinguish lapsed from 
active donors as they show different motivational pattern [17]. 
Clinical Trials Approach 
It has been argued that a ‘clinical trials’ model should be applied to behavioural 
interventions [18-19]. This assumes that behavioural interventions, like pharmaceutical 
interventions, have active ingredients that can have positive effects as well as adverse side-
effects [19]. Thus, before rolling out national behavioural intervention campaigns, feasibility 
trial or RCTs , it is necessary to conduct early stage 1 and 2 laboratory studies [18]. Set 
within this perspective we present two laboratory studies to test the hypothesis that blood 
donors are sensitive to violations of fairness and explore the active ingredient of VRA.  
Hypotheses 
Active blood donors, compared to non-donors will: (1) endorse stronger beliefs for 
reciprocal fairness, (2) endorse stronger norms of both positive and negative reciprocity and 
(3) be more likely to reject ambiguously unfair offers in an UG. Lapsed donors will show a 
similar but weaker pattern.  
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Study 1: Norms of Reciprocity and Reciprocal and Distributive Fairness Beliefs 
This study tests if active blood donors, compared to non-donors, will: (1) endorse 
stronger beliefs of reciprocal fairness and (2) have stronger norms of both positive and 
negative reciprocity. 
Method 
Sample 
Using a non-specific sampling strategy (not targeting blood donors and no mention of 
blood donation in recruitment materials) a convenience sample of 400 undergraduate students 
were recruited (mean age = 20.3; SD = 3.3; 53% female; See Supplementary File S1 for 
sample size determination).  
Measures 
Personal Norms of Reciprocity. These were assessed using the Personal Norms of 
Reciprocity (PNP) scale, a standardized, reliable and valid measure developed by Perugini et 
al [20]. Positive reciprocity is assessed by 9 items (α = .75) and negative reciprocity by 9 
items (α = .86). Participants indicate the extent to which each item is true of them (1 
completely disagree, to 5 completely agree). Trait individual differences in norms of 
reciprocity are both stable over time [21]. 
Reciprocal and Distributive fairness. As there are no existing scales to assess 
reciprocal and distributive fairness for blood donation, we designed five items to index them. 
Three item assessed reciprocal fairness  (1) “As others have donated blood, it is only fair that 
I do”, (2) “I think it is only fair that everyone donates blood” and (3) “Blood is a resource that 
is needed, so we should share it”. Distributive fairness was assessed by 2 items (1) “If 
someone has not donated blood, is still fair that they receive a transfusion” and (2) “It is only 
fair that those who have donated blood get 1st choice on a transfusion” (reverse scored). 
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VRA Manipulation: We created four VRA conditions: Participants either answered: 
(1) two questions on their willingness to make a donation and to accept a transfusion (Full 
VRA condition), or (2) one questions on their willingness to accept a transfusion (Acceptance 
condition), or (3) one questions on their willingness to make a donation (Make condition) or 
(4) neither question (Control). 
Blood Donor Status: The following procedure was used to index non-donor, lapsed 
and active donor status. Initially respondents indicated if they had ever donated blood 
(Yes/No). Those who indicated ‘No’ were classed as non-donors. Those indicating ‘Yes’ then 
indicated: (1) “Have you ever donated blood in the past, but do not now?” Yes/No and (2) 
“Are you currently an active blood donor?” Yes/No. Answering ‘Yes’ to the first question 
resulted in ‘lapsed donor’ classification and ‘Yes’ to the second as ‘active donor’ 
classification. This is a standard and reliable index of blood donor status [22-23]. 
Other Pro-social Acts: Participants responded to each of the following questions: Yes 
or No, to indicate (1) a family norm/attitude to helping (“Are your close family members 
involved in any form of charity work”), (2) effortful helping (“I have taken part in fund-
raising events”), (3) financial helping (“I have donated money) and (4) other health 
philanthropy (“I am on the organ donors register”). 
Design & Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of four VRA conditions, (N = 100 per 
condition), and then completed the indices of reciprocal and distributive fairness and norms of 
reciprocity. The study was registered and approved by the University of Nottingham, School 
of Psychology ethics procedures (ref 193).  
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Results & Discussion 
Donor Status and Prosocial Self-Categorization 
Of the 400 participants, 319 (79.75%) were non-donors, 39 (9.75%) lapsed donors 
and 42 (10.5%) active donors. A total of 154 reported being on the organ donor register 
(38%), 146 (37%) had family members involved in charity, 302 (75%) had been involved in 
fundraising and 313 (78%) had donated money. Being an active donor was positively 
associated with being on the organ register but unrelated to fundraising and donating money 
(see Supplementary File S2). 
Is Blood Donor Status Predicted by Norms of Reciprocity? 
Individual differences in norm reciprocity were entered as predictors of donor status 
in a multi-nominal regression model. We controlled for age and sex effects that may 
influence norms of reciprocity [22] other pro-social behaviours, and experimental condition. 
Experimental condition was included as norms of positive reciprocity were significantly 
higher in the accept (B = 1.39; Se= .665 p = .038; 95% CI 0.08, 2.69) and VRA (B = 1.50; Se= 
.640 p = .019; 95% CI 0.25, 2.76) conditions compared to the control condition. Active 
donors, compared to non-donors, are more likely to hold stronger norms about both positive 
and negative reciprocity (Table 1). There were no significant associations for lapsed donors. 
Norms of reciprocity did not predict organ donor status, fundraising or donating money, but 
positive reciprocity predicted familial pro-sociality (Supplementary File S2). 
Structure of Fairness Beliefs.  To provide initial validity for our distinction between 
reciprocal and distributive fairness we applied Principal Axis Factor (PAF) analysis with 
oblique rotation to the 5 fairness items we designed. Based on the Scree test, a 2 factor 
solution (Table 2) was supported. The three reciprocal fairness items loaded onto factor 1 and 
the two distributive fairness items onto factor 2. Both factors were internally reliable 
(reciprocal fairness α = .70 and distributive fairness inter-item correlation = .36). 
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Prediction of Fairness Beliefs.  Predictors of both reciprocal and distributive fairness 
beliefs were analyzed jointly using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models (Table 3) 
to account for the correlated error variance across the two regression models (Breusch-Pagan 
χ2 = 6.83, p = .009). Blood donor status (active and lapsed) predicted having stronger beliefs 
in reciprocal fairness but not distributive fairness. This association was twice as large for 
active compared to lapsed donors. Neither reciprocal nor distributive fairness were predicted 
by other non-health pro-social acts but are associated with being with being on the donor 
register. Thus, blood donation is specific to reciprocal fairness while endorsing being on the 
organ donor register is general to both reciprocal and distributive fairness. Those exposed to 
the acceptance VRA condition were also more likely to endorse reciprocal fairness. 
Distributive fairness was endorsed more by women. When norms of reciprocity are 
controlled (Supplementary File S2), the results remain the same.  
Sensitivity Analyses. To ensure that these results were not a function of different 
number of cases for active (N= 42), lapsed (N = 39) and non-donors (N = 319), we randomly 
selected 39 participants from the active and non-donors and re-ran all the regression analyses. 
The results were identical to those presented above. 
Study 2: Ultimatum Game and Violations of Fairness Norms 
Study 2 tests the third hypothesis: compared to non-donors, blood donors will be more 
likely to reject ambiguously unfair offers in an ultimatum game.  
Method 
Sample 
A non-directed convenience sample of 60 undergraduate students were recruited to the 
experiment and tested individually (mean age = 21.8; SD = 1.8; 55% female: See 
Supplementary File S1).  
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Procedure: The Ultimatum Game 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) was programmed in E-Prime and consisted of 64 offers. 
Thirty-two trials were of equal 50:50 splits. For the 60:40, 70:30, 80:20 and 90:10 there were 
8 trials each. The distribution of trials is designed to represent the distribution of trials 
observed in typical UGs [10]. All participants completed the 64 trials, presented in a 
randomized order for each individual, seated in an individual experimental cubical. All 
participants played the role of the recipient and were told that if they rejected the offer, 
neither got the money and if they accepted it they and the proposer got the money in terms of 
the offer made. At the start, participants were told that 64 proposers had been given £10 
($16.72) and asked how much they would give to another individual. Each UG trial was 
played as follows (see Figure 1). At the start of the trial, the participant was presented with a 
fixation point for 2 seconds, followed by the ID number (no photographs or names were 
used) of the proposer making the offer (e.g., Proposer 32). Responders were then presented 
with the ‘offer screen’ in the format “THEY KEEP £7, YOU GET £3”.  The ‘offer screen’ 
remained visible for 2s followed by the ‘response screen’. On the ‘response screen’ the 
recipient indicated their decision to accept (by pressing a green key) or reject (by pressing a 
red key) the presented offer. The amount of time taken to make decision (decision time: DT) 
by each participants was recorded automatically (these data are not analyzed – see 
Supplementary File S3). A screen then reminded them of their decision – for example:  ‘You 
Accepted. Proposer 32 gets £7 and you get £3’. This feedback was displayed for 2s. After this 
a new trial began. There is good evidence that rejection decisions in the UG represent a 
temporally stable preference [24]. 
There was no show up fee, but the UG was incentivized using a conditional lottery 
mechanism whereby participants were told they are making decisions for real money, and 
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that after the experiment one of their 64 trials would be selected at random and they will be 
paid based on that trial [25]. All participants were debriefed and paid at the end of the study.   
The study design was registered and approved by the  University of Nottingham, 
School of Psychology ethics procedure (AS/hcf 27th October 2010).  
Blood donor Status. Blood donor status was indexed by asking: “Are you currently a 
blood donor?”  Yes/No/Used to be. 
Results & Discussion 
Blood Donor Status 
Of the 60 participants, 40 (66.7%) were non-donors, 16 (26.7%) donors (4 lapsed 
donors: 6.7%). Lapsed donors were excluded from the analyses. 
Ultimatum Game Rejection Rates 
To test the hypothesis that blood donors are less likely to accept unfair offers (60:40 
to 90:10) and in particular ambiguously unfair offers (60:40 and 70:30), we conducted a 4 
(unfair offer) by 2 (donor status) repeated measures ANOVA, with proportion of the four 
unfair offers (60:40 to 90:10) as the within subjects factor and donor status as the between 
subjects factor. Type III sum-of-squares was used to account for the unequal cell sizes. The 
results showed (1) a main effect for unfair offers (F Greenhouse–Geisser correction (2.3, 127.07) 
= 93.91, p = .000, p  = .6350) with acceptance rates linearly reducing with increased 
unfairness (F (1, 54) = 194.34, p = .027, p  = .783), (2) a main effect for donor status (F (1, 54) 
= 6.15, p = .016, p = .102) with donors having a lower overall acceptance rate (see Figure 2) 
and (3) an interaction between donor status and unfairness of offers (F Greenhouse–Geisser 
correction (2.3, 127.07) = 3.47, p = .027, p = .060: see Figure 3). Figure 3 shows that this 
interaction was, as hypothesized, predominantly observed for the ambiguously unfair offers 
of 60:40 and 70:10. The results show clearly that, compared to non-donors, blood donors are 
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more sensitive to violations of norms of fairness, and more likely to reject unfair offers and 
especially if the unfairness is ambiguous. 
General Discussion 
The ‘mechanisms of altruism’ (MOA) approach to blood donor motivation, proposes 
the need to explore how the theoretical mechanisms that underlie altruism can either 
differentiate donors and non-donors or predict blood donor behaviour [1]. The results 
reported here explore mechanisms based on fairness norms. The results show that active, and 
to a lesser extent lapsed donors, were more likely to endorse reciprocal fairness with active 
donors endorsed higher levels of positive and negative reciprocity relative to non-donors. 
Active donors, compared to non-donors, also rejected more unfair offers, especially 
ambiguously unfair offers, in the UG. As well as being consistent with the idea of blood 
donors as reluctant altruist, the results also support the idea that active blood donors were 
more willing, than non-donors, to incur personal cost to reject unfair offers, thus signaling 
disapproval, and maintaining their self-image as a morally good ‘saintly’ person [1, 26].  
Practical Implications. These studies also provide insights for donor recruitment. 
First, the blood donor profile is different to other acts of pro-sociality and as such targeting 
other pro-social acts to recruit may no be successful. Second these results show that asking if 
a person would accept a transfusion (a component of voluntary reciprocal altruism VRA) 
also increases a sense of reciprocal fairness - the same motivation that underlies blood 
donation. This matching of motivations across intervention and person is likely to result in 
more successful campaigns [27]. Thus, VRA should help to maintain active donors and 
reactivating lapsed donors. 
Clinical Trails: Surveys and Experiments. 
We advocate a clinical trials model for behavioral interventions. This paper shows why 
experiments are a valuable first step. Triangulation of results across these different 
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experimental methods strengthen any conclusions and helps minimize the influence of any 
one method bias. For example, surveys may suffer from common method variance [but see 
28] and social desirability responding, while experimental studies may lack external validity 
[but see 29]. The next step would be to conduct acceptability trials to develop the 
accumulated evidence before a full RCT and ultimate deployment of a campaign.  
Caveat 
While not answering the casual question – “do blood donors (actually sampled or self-
categorized) endorse reciprocal fairness or are those who have reciprocal fairness preferences 
more likely to be blood donors?” – we do show these motivations are specific to blood 
donation and that interventions that focus on reciprocal norms may be uniquely important for 
maintaining active donors and re-activating lapsed donors. 
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Table 1. Multi-Nominal Regression Model Predicting Donor Status From Reciprocity Norms 
   95% CI 
 B (se) p Lower Upper 
Lapsed Donors     
Positive Reciprocity Norms 0.07 (0.04) .669 -0.07 0.10 
Negative Reciprocity Norms -0.01 (0.02) .559 -0.06 0.03 
Age 0.08 (0.05) .107 -0.02 0.19 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) -0.19(0.37) .616 -0.54 0.92 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(a) -0.24 (0.48) .614 -1.19 0.71 
  Make a donation(a) -0.32 (0.49) .509 -1.28 0.64 
   VRA (accept + make) (a) -0.54 (0.50) .284 -1.52 0.45 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) -0.33 (0.48) .485 -1.29 0.61 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) 0.88 (0.37) .020* 0.14 1.61 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) -0.16 (0.47) .735 -1.09 0.77 
On the Organ Donor Register (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.82 (0.36) .025* 0.11 1.53 
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   95% CI 
 B (se) p Lower Upper 
Active Donors     
Positive Reciprocity Norms 0.10 (0.04) .016* 0.02 0.18 
Negative Reciprocity Norms 0.05 (0.03) .053* -0.0006 0.11 
Age 0.07 (0.06) .264 -0.05 0.20 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) -0.21 (0.45) .623 -1.07 0.64 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(a) -0.32 (0.34) .345 -0.98 0.34 
  Make a donation(a) -0.30 (0.34) .370 -0.97 0.36 
   VRA (accept + make) (a) -0.43 (0.35) .341 -1.03 0.36 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0,16 (0.30) .591 -0.43 0.76 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) -0.13 (0.25) .611 -0.62 0.36 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.02 (0.39) .953 -0.59 0.61 
On the Organ Donor Register (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.54 (0.25 .033* 0.04 1.04 
 
Note. Reference group in non-donors. Total N = 385. (a) Reference category for experimental 
manipulation is the control condition 
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Table 2. Promax Rotated Factor Matrix for Fairness Beliefs 
 Reciprocal 
Fairness 
Distributive 
Fairness 
As others have donated blood it is only fair that I do .79 -.07 
I think it is only fair that everyone donates blood .67 -.21 
Blood is a resources that is needed so we should share it .65 .13 
It is only fair that those who have donated blood get 1st choice on a 
transfusion 
.08 -.66 
If someone has not donated blood is still fair that they receive a transfusion .00 .54 
Correlation between latent factors 1  
-.05 1 
Eigenvalue 
(% variance) 
1.91 
(38.18%) 
1.40 (27.93) 
Reliability α = .70 mic = .36 
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Table 3. Seemingly Unrelated Regression for Reciprocal and Distributive Fairness Beliefs 
   95% CI 
 B (se) p Lower Upper 
Reciprocal Fairness     
Donor Status     
   Lapsed(a) 1.31 (0.66) .048* 0.01 2.61 
   Active(a) 2.53 (0.65) .000*** 1.25 3.82 
Age 0.02 (0.06) .732 -0.09 0.13 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) -0.23(0.39) .551 -1.00 0.53 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(b) 1.18 (0.55) .032* 0.10 2.26 
  Make a donation(b) -0.42 (0.54) .433 -1.47 0.64 
   VRA (accept + make) (b) -0.19 (0.55) .731 -1.26 0.88 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.42 (0.49) .386 -0.54 1.40 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) -0.39 (0.41) .341 -1.19 0.41 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.37 (0.48) .430 -0.56 1.32 
On the Organ Donor Register (0 = no. 1 = yes) 1.05(0.42) .012* 0.23 1.87 
R2 .11; p = .000     
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   95% CI 
 B (se) p Lower Upper 
Distributive Fairness     
Donor Status     
   Lapsed(a) -0.51 (0.41) .212 -1.31 0.29 
   Active(a) 0.62(0.40) .123 -0.17 1.41 
Age 0.01 (0.04) .780 -0.06 0.08 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) -0.85 (0.24) .000*** -1.33 -0.38 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(b) -0.32 (0.34) .349 -0.98 0.35 
  Make a donation(b) -0.30 (0.33) .366 -0.95 0.35 
   VRA (accept + make) (b) -0.34 (0.34) .319 -0.99 0.32 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.16 (0.30) .593 -0.43 0.76 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) -0.13 (0.25) .615 -0.62 0.37 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.02 (0.29) .953 -0.56 0.59 
On the Organ Donor Register (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.54 (0.26) .034* 0.04 1.04 
R2 .07; p = .002     
 
Note. Total N = 394. (a) Reference category for donor status is non-donor; (b) Reference 
category for experimental manipulation is the control condition 
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Figure 1. Ultimatum Game Schematic of Procedure 
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Figure 2. Mean Difference in Acceptance Rates for Unfair Offer between Donors and Non-
Donors (error bars = 95% CIs) 
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Figure 3.  Interaction between donor status (donor vs non-donor) and Degree of Unfairness 
in Offers (error bars = 95% CIs) 
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Supplementary File S1: Sampling Strategy & Sample Size Estimations 
This file details sampling strategy used in the two studies and the sample size 
estimations. 
Sampling Strategy 
Blood donor recruitment/retention campaigns (1) take place distally to donation and 
(2) people’s emotional response to blood donation changes the more proximal they are to 
making a donation [1]. Thus, sampling at blood drives may lead to biased results for 
recruitment/retention purposes. Also actively recruiting blood donors to laboratory studies 
may bias sampling. Thus, rather than recruit blood donors to studies we ask people to self-
classify as blood donors which is a reliable index of blood donor status [2-4] 
Study 1: Psychometric Study 
The N of 400 was based on the following considerations. A Cohen’s d of 1.05 for 
people’s preferences to donate blood has been reported for a VRA manipulation [5]. Thus to 
achieve 80% power with α of .05 requires 32 per cell [6]. Ferguson et al [7] reported an 
average effect size with a d of 0.65 comparing blood donors vs non-donors on an economic 
game, which equates to an N of 39 per cell to compare lapsed or active donors to non-donors. 
Given that 20-26% generally self-categorize as a donor in these types of studies [7] we 
sampled 400 participants to give approximately 80 reporting donating in the past. Whether 
these would be split equally between active and lapsed donors would be observed rather than 
predicted. 
Study 2: Ultimatum Game 
Bethel-Haurwitz et al [8] reported a significant effect on UG rejection rates for 16 
living altruistic kidney donors compared to 29 controls. . Furthermore, main effects for blood 
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donors vs controls has been reported with similar sample sizes on other economic games [7]. 
Thus given that 20-26% usually report being a blood donor we recruited 60 participants to 
sample 20 donors. 
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Supplementary File S2: Additional analyses for Study 1 
This file contain addition analyses to support the conclusion drawn from study 1 
Table S1. Logistic Regression Models Prediction Other Pro-social Behaviours 
   95% CI 
 OR p Lower Upper 
Organ Donor Status     
Positive Reciprocity 0.98 .481 0.93 1.03 
Negative Reciprocity 0.98 .315 0.95 1.02 
Age 0.98 .564 0.92 1.05 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.72 .180 0.46 1.16 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(b) 1.34 .369 0.70 2.55 
  Make a donation(b) 0.95 .889 0.50 1.82 
   VRA (accept + make) (b) 1.60 .143 0.85 3.02 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) 1.79 .067 1.0.96 3.35 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) 1.15 .561 0.72 1.84 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) 1.66 .090 0.92 3.01 
Blood Donor Status     
Lapsed (a) 2.38 .018 1.15 4.92 
Active (a) 9.99 .000 4.16 24.03 
R2; p = .000 
 
 
0.11    
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   95% CI 
 OR p Lower Upper 
Donated Money     
Positive Reciprocity 1.06 .053 0.99 1.12 
Negative Reciprocity 0.96 .087 0.93 1.00 
Age 1.12 .065 0.99 1.26 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.60 .084 0.34 1.06 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(b) 0.77 .513 0.34 1.69 
  Make a donation(b) 0.77 .494 0.37 1.61 
   VRA (accept + make) (b) 1.53 .308 0.67 3.49 
Organ Donor Status (0 = no, 1 = yes) 1.90 .050 0.99 3.61 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) 1.56 .155 0.84 2.92 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) 4.66 .000 2.58 8.43 
Blood Donor Status     
Lapsed (a) 0.75 .558 0.29 1.94 
Active (a) 0.63 .384 0.22 1.78 
R2; p = .000 
 
 
 
 
 
.16    
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   95% CI 
 OR p Lower Upper 
Familial Pro-Sociality     
Positive Reciprocity 1.05 .048 1.00 1.10 
Negative Reciprocity 1.00 .765 0.97 1.04 
Age 0.98 .522 0.91 1.04 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.71 .153 0.45 1.13 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(b) 0.84 .589 0.45 1.57 
  Make a donation(b) 0.74 .333 0.40 1.37 
   VRA (accept + make) (b) 0.57 .074 0.30 1.06 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) 1.61 .129 0.87 2.96 
Organ Donor Status (0 = no, 1 = Yes) 1.15 .554 0.72 1.85 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) 1.91 .030 1.07 3.44 
Blood Donor Status     
Lapsed (a) 2.43 .016 1.17 5.00 
Active (a) 2.41 .019 1.15 5.04 
R2; p = .000 
 
 
 
 
 
.07    
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   95% CI 
 OR p Lower Upper 
Fundraising     
Positive Reciprocity 0.95 .083 0.89 1.01 
Negative Reciprocity 0.99 .959 0.96 1.04 
Age 0.98 .703 0.91 1.07 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.67 .153 0.39 1.15 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(b) 4.76 .001 1.97 11.47 
  Make a donation(b) 0.99 .995 0.51 1.95 
   VRA (accept + make) (b) 1.31 .448 0.64 2.67 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) 4.42 .000 2.46 7.93 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) 1.97 .025 1.09 3.56 
Organ Donor Status (0 = no. 1 = yes) 1.67 .093 0.92 3.02 
Blood Donor Status     
Lapsed (a) 0.81 .660 0.32 2.03 
Active (a) 1.04 .938 0.39 2.77 
R2; p = .000 .15    
 
Note. Total N = 385 for each model. (a) Reference category for donor status is non-donor; (b) 
Reference category for experimental manipulation is the control condition 
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Table S2. Seemingly Unrelated Regression for Reciprocal and Distributive Fairness Beliefs 
including Norms of Reciprocity 
   95% CI 
 B (se) p Lower Upper 
Reciprocal Fairness     
Donor Status     
   Lapsed(a) 1.31 .050 -0.002 2.63 
   Active(a) 2.22 .001 0.88 3.55 
Age 0.008 .889 -0.11 0.12 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) -0.26 .520 -1.06 0.53 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(b) 0.89 .115 -0.22 1.99 
  Make a donation(b) -0.50 .358 -1.57 0.57 
   VRA (accept + make) (b) -0.43 .438 -1.51 0.65 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.35 .491 -0.65 1.35 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) -0.54 .195 -1.35 0.28 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.49 .323 -0.48 1.45 
On the Organ Donor Register (0 = no. 1 = yes) 1.18 .005 0.34 2.01 
Positive Reciprocity 0.11 .016 0.02 0.19 
Negative Reciprocity -0.003 .911 -0.06 0.05 
R2 .12; p = .000     
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   95% CI 
 B (se) p Lower Upper 
Distributive Fairness     
Donor Status     
   Lapsed(a) -0.61 .133 -.40 0.19 
   Active(a) 0.75 .068 -0.06 1.56 
Age 0.004 .896 -0.06 0.07 
Sex (0 = female, 1 = male) -0.60 .015 -1.07 -0.11 
Experimental Conditions     
  Accept a donation(b) -0.32 .346 -0.99 0.3 
  Make a donation(b) -0.34 .309 -0.98 0.32 
   VRA (accept + make) (b) -0.33 .330 -0.98 0.33 
Donate Money (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.06 .846 -0.55 0.67 
Family Involved in Charity (0 = no, 1 = Yes) -0.08 .738 -0.57 0.41 
Fundraising (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.07 .808 -0.51 0.65 
On the Organ Donor Register (0 = no. 1 = yes) 0.43 .093 -0.07 0.93 
Positive Reciprocity 0.03 .194 -0.02 0.09 
Negative Reciprocity -0.07 .000 -0.11 -0.04 
R2 .11; p = .000     
 
Note. Total N = 384. (a) Reference category for donor status is non-donor; (b) Reference 
category for experimental manipulation is the control condition 
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Supplementary File S3: Decision Time Data 
There is now a growing debate about how to interpret decision time data of this type. 
Results show that extreme responders – very fast and very slow – may be more cooperative 
[1] and the recommendation now is not to use DT data to explore intuitive cooperation but 
rather experimentally manipulated time delays. As such, DT data are not presented here. 
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not reflective: Decision conflict drives reaction times in social dilemmas. Journal of 
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